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Abstract
The theoretical analysis of merger poses a number of paradoxes. If
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11 Introduction
The game theoretical analysis of mergers and coalition formation poses a
number of paradoxes.
The ‘merger paradox’ identiﬁes the path-breaking result by Salant-Switzer-
Reynolds[14] who report that in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous
products, linear demand and cost functions, a merger is beneﬁcial for parti-
cipating ﬁrms if more than 80 per cent of all ﬁrms merge. This is because
"outsiders" enjoy more beneﬁts than the ﬁrms participating in the merger,
the "insiders". Since production costs are linear, any coalition of ﬁrms is
indiﬀerent with respect to the way of splitting its total production among
the members of the coalition, so every coalition of ﬁrms behaves as if it were
as i n g l eﬁrm. Perry-Porter[10] and Farrell-Shapiro[6] challenge the view that
am e r g e dﬁrm is no larger than any of the constituent ﬁrms. These studies
introduce the existence of some crucial assets that are in limited supply in
order to capture the notion that some ﬁrms are larger than others in a ho-
mogeneous product industry. This assumption implies rising marginal cost
of output production and, consequently, internal cost savings from mergers
could make a merger proﬁtable.
Under price competition and diﬀerentiated products, Deneckere-Davidson[5]
show that mergers are always proﬁtable for insiders. However, according
to the intuition of Stigler[13], the equilibrium displays free-riding proper-
ties: "outsiders" always earn higher proﬁts than "insiders". A more recent
literature takes into account strategic delegation (Gonzalez Maestre-Lopez
Cunat[7] or Ziss[16]) to study merger proﬁtability. Two types of competition
are considered: in production and in the remuneration of managers. The
eﬀect of delegation is to increase competition between entities inside the
ﬁrm. Consequently, the incentives to merge and the proﬁtability of merger
are considerably increased taking into account delegation, with respect to the
standard setting. The required fraction of merger participants for a merger
to be proﬁtable is substantially smaller with delegation.
2McAﬀee-Simons-Williams[8] suggest that the merger paradox can disap-
pear in a context of spatial competition when market deﬁnition is considered.
They show that a merger can result in a bigger ﬁrm than the two previous en-
tities because it combines the plants of the two ﬁrms. But Norman-Pepall[9]
show that internal proﬁtability of the merger is not restored in the context
of McAﬀee-Simons-Williams[8] and that the merging ﬁrms can lose market
share, depending on the cost heterogeneity between ﬁrms. In a context of
spatial competition in the circle, Brito[1] shows that even if market power
is the sole motivation for merger, ﬁrms can be interested in being insiders
( p r e - e m p t i v em e r g e r )a n dt h ei m p a c to ft h em e r g e ro nt h er i v a lﬁrms depend
on their location. Firms can prefer to be insiders even if some of the outsiders
beneﬁt more (but others less) from the merger than insiders.
The "traditional" approach to spatial competition uses the circular city
model of Vickrey[15], also referred to as the Salop[12] model: one of its limit
is to address only "localized" spatial competition (Rothschild[11]). Chen-
Riordan[4] develop a new analytical tool to analyze spatial diﬀerentiation
which naturally ﬁts to the idea of "non-localized" competition. In the spokes
model ﬁrms are located at the extreme of a market constituted of several
spokes all linked at a common centre. There may be more spokes than ﬁrms
(Chen-Riordan[4]) or as many spokes as ﬁrms (Caminal-Claici[2]). The model
has three main properties. First, it allows multi-ﬁrm spatial competition
with no neighbouring eﬀects; second, it captures monopolistic competition
àl aC h a m b e r l i nas the number of ﬁrms and spokes tends to inﬁnity; third,
for some regions of the parameters, competition has a price increasing eﬀect:
this is due to the higher elasticity of demand in monopolistic segments as
compared to the competitive ones.
The main result of this paper is to show that the price competition merger
paradox, i.e. the free-riding property, does not necessarily arise as an equi-
librium of the spokes model when horizontal mergers takes place. Conditions
are devised for which this is the case. The spokes model, in fact, displays
3diﬀerent types of equilibria depending on which part of the market the ﬁrms
focus in supplying consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the spokes model.
The eﬀects of a merger are analyzed in section 3. In section 4, we illustrate
the properties of the equilibrium, comparing the pre-merger with the post-
merger equilibria. Concluding remarks follow in section 5. All proofs and
mathematical derivations can be found in Appendices A, B and C.
2T h e F r a m e w o r k
The framework chosen is the one introduced by Chen-Riordan[4]. The market
has a spatial structure made up of N spokes of constant length, normalized
to 1/2, with a common core. Suppose there are n ﬁrms entering the market
and n ≤ N is exogenously given. Each ﬁrm locates at the extreme of her own
spoke and supplies an homogeneous good: transportation costs are the only
source of diﬀerentiation. Customers are uniformly distributed over all the
N spokes. It is assumed that consumers have to travel to the ﬁrm’s outlet
in order to get the product. This implies that ﬁrms are no longer able to
condition the price on the consumers’ location. Instead of a discriminatory
schedule that includes the transportation cost, a unique mill price is chosen
by ﬁrms averaging between the diﬀerent market segments. However, from the
viewpoint of ﬁrms, this limited amount of ﬂexibility in pricing has positive
eﬀects: price competition is less ﬁerce as undercutting at each location is
not possible in this setting. The unit transportation cost t is constant and
consumers have a homogeneous valuation of the good v.
A crucial assumption is that customers only care about the brand loc-
ated on the same spoke as they are and only one alternative brand. For each
individual the alternative brand is extracted randomly between the N po-
tentially available. This implies that both the favourite and the alternative
brand may not be supplied and so not all consumers are served in equilibrium.
4F i g u r e1 :T h eS p o k e sM o d e lw i t hn =5and N =8 .
For example, supposing two consumers who like Fanta enter a supermarket.
Fanta is not available; although not fully satisfying, they both have a second
favourite brand: the assumption implies they can both like Sprite or per-
haps one likes Sprite and the other likes Dr. Pepper. In the supermarket,
however, there might be Dr.Pepper available but not Sprite. Although this
seems a rather strong hypothesis, it is introduced by Chen-Riordan[4] to al-
low the tractability of the model and, in particular, the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. A number of possible interpretations of why this could
be the case are reported in their article. A convincing interpretation in the
example reported above is that only the ﬁrst two favourite brands give the
consumers a positive utility, while all others do not. Alternatively, other
example involving a spatial interpretation of the market might have to do
with the consumers’ imperfect knowledge of the areas where he or she is not
located.
5The proﬁt function of the generic ﬁrm i is described by:
πi(pi,p −i)=( pi − ci)D(pi,p −i)
To characterize the demand function,observe that from the ﬁrm’s viewpoint
there are several types of customers1:
1. Customers on i-th ﬁrm’s spoke that have one of the other ﬁr m sa sa n
alternative. The demand from this group is deﬁned by identifying the
location ˆ x of the consumers who are indiﬀerent between buying from i
or buying from the rival ﬁrm α:













The constraints imposed simply require the customer to be located on
either of the spokes and not outside.
2. Customers on the i-th ﬁrm’s spoke who do not have an existing altern-
ative brand and customers who do not have a ﬁrst favorite brand but
have i as a second favorite. The indiﬀerent customer in the set of these
two types is identiﬁed by:










































where 2/N is the density of consumers at each point of the spokes, 1/(N −1)
is the probability of j being a customers’ second favorite brand and (N −
n)/(N −1) is the probability of a consumer having no ﬁrst or second favorite
1Notice that ﬁrms, despite recognizing diﬀerent types of customers, are constrained to
use a unique price and are not allowed any kind of price discrimination.




2 ∀α 6= i and
v−pi
t ≥ 1/2.













































Consistent with Chen-Riordan[4], the attention will be focused on a situation
in which ﬁrms are symmetric and have access to the same production tech-
nology, characterized by a constant marginal cost ci = c ∀i =1 ...n.T h eﬁrst
order conditions identifying the equilibrium prices are given by:
∂πi
∂pi






























































Given the deﬁnition of the demand and the proﬁt functions, it can be checked
that there exist four possible equilibrium regions.
The equilibrium regions can be characterized depending on the parameter
v, the valuation of the good. As in Chen-Riordan[4], the Nash equilibrium
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. The derivation of the equilibrium ex-
pressions and the regions in which they hold follow Chen-Riordan[4] and are
reproduced in Appendix A. As illustrated in Figure 2 the price is a non-
decreasing function of the value of the good v.F o rv a l u e sa b o v e¯ vbm ap u r e
strategy equilibrium of the game does not exist. A too large valuation of the
good implies ﬁrms have a unilateral incentive to raise their price to p = v−t
which is however not an equilibrium either. In Region I standard oligopoly
competition takes place: v is large enough so that ﬁrms focus on the segment
of consumers who have both a ﬁrst and a second favourite brand, in other
words the demand that the ﬁrm shares with all competing ﬁrms. The price
is independent of v and depends only on the number of ﬁrms and spokes.
All consumers who have a preference for an existing brand participate in the
8Figure 2: Nash Equilibrium prices as a function of value for c =0and t =1 ,
from Chen-Riordan[4].
market. Region II is characterized by a kink in the demand function: ﬁrms
concentrate on extracting surplus on the indiﬀerent consumers who do not
have a second favourite brand. Also in this case all the consumers with at
least one favourite brand are served in equilibrium. The price increases lin-
early with v: this is the parameter characterizing the indiﬀerent consumers
that ﬁrms consider when setting the price. In Region III ﬁrms’ prices are
driven by the indiﬀerent consumer who does not have an alternative. All
surplus is extracted from this type of consumer and some of them are not
served in equilibrium. On the other hand, the indiﬀerent consumer who has
both the ﬁrst and the second brand available maintains a positive surplus.
As v increases, price increases as it is possible to extract more surplus from
the consumers on the monopolistic segment of the market. This region has
the interesting property that price is increasing with the number of active
ﬁrms, as demand is more elastic in the monopolistic segment. Region IV is
characterized by a diﬀerent kink of the demand function: ﬁrms focus on the
indiﬀerent consumer who have their brand as ﬁrst favourite. As in Region
9III also in this region not all consumers with at least one favourite brand
are served: in particular, only consumers with a ﬁrst favourite brand parti-
cipate on the market in this case. For even lower values of v an equilibrium
would exist but all ﬁrms would be local monopolists serving only part of the
consumers located on their spoke.
3 Horizontal Mergers
Once introduced the framework, the focus can shift on the eﬀects of an
horizontal merger. The question posed is: what is the eﬀect of a merger
between symmetric ﬁrms in a spatial model of non-localized competition?
Following the industrial organization literature, it is assumed that the
merging ﬁrms maximize their joint proﬁts. The proﬁts after the merger are
split in equal parts between the participating ﬁrms. In other words, the only
eﬀect of a merger is to create a multi-product ﬁrm: they supply their product
independently but they adopt joint decisions on their prices to maximize the
joint proﬁts. This makes our results comparable with Caminal-Granero[3]
who explicitly address the role of multi-product ﬁrms in supplying variety.
As it will be clear, the results reported are consistent with theirs: as they
focus on the analog of Region I of Chen-Riordan[4], the free-riding property
makes a larger multi-product ﬁrm competitively disadvantaged as compared
with a fringe of single product ﬁrms. However in what follows asymmetric
competition is analyzed in all equilibrium regions of the spokes model.
A key-point is to recognize that in the new situation, after the merger
of two symmetric ﬁrms, there is no market expansion eﬀect: the probability
for a given customer of having no liked brand available on the market does
not change. The probability, in fact, depends only on the number of spokes
occupied and not on the number of active ﬁrms.
103.1 The Eﬀects of a Merger
Suppose that ﬁrm i h a sb e e nf o r m e db yt h em e r g e ro fk of the n symmetric
ﬁrms of the benchmark model. All other ﬁrms are exactly symmetric. While
the number of spokes N is exogenous and not aﬀected by the merger, the
number of active ﬁrms reduces to m = n − k +1 .
Focus ﬁrst on the merged ﬁrms who constituted i.I n o r d e r t o d e ﬁne the
demand function for this new ﬁrm, the identiﬁcation of indiﬀerent customers
is again the starting point. It turns out that the same expressions identifying
the indiﬀerent consumers remain valid, with a slightly diﬀerent interpreta-
tion. The equation:
v − pi − tx = v − pj − t(1 − x) ∀i =1 ...k ∀j 6= i
identiﬁes the indiﬀerent customer between the ones who have an alternative
brand existing on the market. The set of indiﬀerent consumers is described
by:













∀i =1 ...k ∀j 6= i
There are, however, two types of indiﬀerent consumers: consumers whose
other brand is supplied by one of the other ﬁrms taking part to the merger
and consumers whose other brand is supplied by one of the outsiders. As in
most of the literature on horizontal mergers it is assumed that ﬁrms, despite
maximizing joint proﬁts, keep their price independence and set their own
price. This implies that the market segment of each ﬁrm is identiﬁed as:













∀i =1 ...k ∀j =1 ..k, j 6= i
Indiﬀerent customers with no kind of alternative brand are still identiﬁed by:










11The conclusion is that, from the perspective of one of the ﬁrms who took
part to the merger and constituted ﬁrm i there are three types of customers
after the merger:
1. k−1
N−1 customers whose second favourite brand is supplied by factories
located on other spokes but belonging to i,t h eﬁrm resulting from the
merger;
2. n−k
N−1 customers who have an alternative brand not supplied by other
factories aﬃliated to i;
3. N−n
N−1 customers who do not have a second favourite brand.
Am a s so f 2
N customers is located at each point of the spatial market
structure. There is a further class of customers which is not of interest to
ﬁr m s :t h ea g e n t st h a td on o th a v eb o t haﬁrst and a second favourite brand
existing on the market. They are excluded from participating in the market
and so their existence does not aﬀect the results: if the number of ﬁrms is
exogenously given, the fraction of this type of consumers is unaﬀected by the
merging activity so that mergers do not imply a market expansion.
The demand function of ﬁrm i, constituted by the k ﬁrms which merged,





















































The total demand is just the sum of the segments faced by the each of
the merging ﬁrms. The ﬁrst term represents consumers with both favour-
ite brands being supplied by i. The second term consumers whose second
12favourite brand is supplied by one of the remaining ﬁrms. The third term
the consumers whose only desired brand is supplied by the ﬁrm. The de-
mand of each of this segment is weighted by the respective probabilities of a
given consumer being one of the three possible types recalled. The demand


















































holding for ∀j =1 ...(n − k). The three terms represent, respectively, the
demand faced from consumers who have as other favourite a brand supplied
by ﬁrm i, consumers who have as other favourite a brand supplied by another
non-merged ﬁrm and consumers whose only desired brand is supplied by the
ﬁrm. The weighting is given by the probabilities of a generic consumers being





(pα − c)Dα(pα,p −α)
πj =( pj − c)Dj(pj,p −j)












=0 ∀i =1 ...k





























∀α =1 ...k,α 6= i
The ﬁrst order conditions for the non-merged ﬁrms are:
∂πj
∂pj
= Dj(pj,p −j)+( pj − c)
∂Dj(pj,p −j)
∂pj
=0 ∀j =1 ...(n − k)
















Comparing the ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n so ft h em e r g e da n dt h en o n - m e r g e dﬁrms
it is clear that the merger imposes on each ﬁrm participating to internalize
the externalities imposed by one’s own price choices on the demand for other
brands. This property, ﬁrst illustrated by Deneckere-Davidson[5], plays an
important role in determining the results in some but not all regions of equi-
librium and it will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
I m p o s i n gar e g u l a r i t yc o n d i t i o nw i t ht h es a m er o l eo ft h eo n ea d o p t e di n
the benchmark case, i.e.
|pα−pi|
2t < 1
2 ∀α 6= i, the analysis of the equilibria
can be performed. In particular, the analysis of the eﬀects of the merger on
prices and proﬁts is proposed in what follows.
3.2 The After-Merger Equilibrium
The results of the analysis proposed can be summarized reporting the after-
merger equilibrium prices and proﬁts for both merging and non-merging
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where the values of v delimiting the diﬀerent regions are:
Region Im c +
t(4nN−3n−2N−kn−k2−2k+1)
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Region IIm c + t4N−2n−k−1
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where the values of v delimiting the diﬀerent regions are:
15Region Inm c +
t(4Nn−2kN−4n−k2+3k)
(2n+k−2)(n−k) <v≤ ¯ vnm














The strategy followed to identify the values of parameters for which the
equilibrium regions exist is analogous to the one followed in the before-merger
benchmark case: all the details are reported in Appendix B.
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The next section discusses these results in detail.
164 Analysis of the Equilibrium Regions
Bringing together the results of the pre-merger benchmark situation in Sec-
tion 2 and the post-merger equilibria, we identify four equilibrium regions.
These regions can be seen as the analog of the four equilibrium regions ana-
lyzed in Chen-Riordan and they are illustrated in Figure 3 and in Example
1. The four equilibrium regions are deﬁned as a function of v as follows:
Region 1 v1D <v≤ v1U
Region 2 v2D <v≤ v2U
Region 3 v3D <v≤ v3U
Region 4 v4D <v≤ v4U
where the limiting values identifying each region are deﬁned as follows:






v2D =m a x {c +2 t,c + t4N−2n−k−1
2N−n−k ,c+2 t}








v4D =m a x {c + t,c + t,c + t}
for downwards, and:
v1U =m i n {¯ vbm, ¯ vm, ¯ vnm}



















17Figure 3: The Equilibrium Regions after the Merger.
for upwards boundaries. These limiting values are nothing but the collection
of the boundaries for the equilibria before merger (identifying Region I to IV
in Section 2) and after merger,f o rb o t hmerging (Region Im-IVm in Section
3) and non-merging ﬁrms (Region Inm-IVnm in Section 3). Appendix B
presents the technical details of how these regions are identiﬁed.
Example 1
Consider the following situation. There are N =7spokes and n =5ﬁrms
entered the market, the marginal cost c is zero and the unit transport cost t
is normalized to one. Two ﬁr m sd e c i d et om e r g e ,s ok =2 . The equilibrium
r e g i o n sf o rt h es p o k e sm o d e lw i t hm e r g e r sa r e :
Region 1 3.400 <v≤ 5.000
Region 2 2.140 <v≤ 3.000
Region 3 1.336 <v≤ 2.000
Region 4 1.000 <v≤ 1.250
18as it can be veriﬁed that:
v1D =m a x {3.000,3.400,3.133}
v2D =m a x {2.000,2.140,2.000}
v3D =m a x {1.250,1.336,1.262}
v4D =m a x {1.000,1.000,1.000}
are the downwards and:
v1U =m i n {5.000,6.400,5.016}
v2U =m i n {3.000,3.667,3.000}
v3U =m i n {2.000,2.115,2.016}
v4U =m i n {1.250,1.357,1.2619}
the upwards boundaries of the equilibrium regions before and after merger,
for merging and non-merging ﬁrms respectively.
4.1 Region 1
Suppose that the parameters are such that all ﬁrms, merged and non-merged,
face the duopoly segment demand while they are monopolist on the empty
spokes. This is the case if, in equilibrium, prices are such that
v−p∗
m
t > 1 and
v−p∗
nm
t > 1. The equilibrium prices are:
p
∗
m = c + t
(2n − 1)(2N − n − 1)
2n2 − n(k +2 )− k2 +2 k
p
∗
nm = c + t
(2N − n − 1)(2n − k)





tk[2N(2n − 1) − 2n2 − n +1 ] 2




t(2n − k)(n − 1)(2N − n − 1)[4Nn+( n +1 ) ( k − 2n)]
N(N − 1)[k2 + k(n − 2) − 2n(n − 1)]2
The results reported directly lead to the following Proposition:






t > 1 and
v−p∗
bm
t > 1,am e r g e rb e t w e e nk ﬁrms displays
the free-riding property: outsider ﬁrms are better oﬀ with respect to the in-






T h eP r o o fc a nb ef o u n di nA p p e n d i xC .
The result found conﬁrm that the price competition mergers paradox
takes place in Region 1. This is an expected result: it can be recalled from
the description of Region I of the benchmark case that this region is char-
acterized by "standard" oligopolistic competition. Under these conditions
the mechanisms highlighted by Deneckere-Davidson[5] are in operation: as
the best response function are upward sloping, prices of both insiders and
outsiders raise their prices, earning higher proﬁts. However, the free-riding
property is also in operation. The intuition provided by Deneckere-Davidson
is the following. A given outsider faces competition from both the merged
entity and the other outsiders. Then, she shares with a given insider n − 2
competitors. But they both face another competitor. For the outsider ﬁrm
this competitor is a member of the merged entity, so a ﬁr mc h a r g i n gah i g h e r
price. The insider, on the other hand, faces competition of another outsider
ﬁrm, which is charging a lower price. This implies that outsiders face less
ﬁerce competition and their proﬁts dominate the ones of insiders. This is
exactly what happens in Region 1. Finally the following example illustrates
the ﬁndings reported.
Example 2
As in Example 1, assume N =7 , n =5 , m =4 , k =2and that
3.4 <v≤ 5.0. As in Chen-Riordan[4] t =1and c =0 ; the demand functions


































































pαDα(pα,p −α) πj = pjDj(pj,p −j)
the Nash equilibrium prices are:
pm =2 .400 pnm =2 .133
πm =0 .823 πnm =0 .433
as compared with the pre-merger status quo that, according to discussion in
Section 2, gives the following results:
pbm =2 πbm =0 .381
4.2 Region 2






t =1 : this straightforwardly
implies that p∗
m = p∗
nm = v − t.
It is extremely simple to show that in equilibrium the proﬁts of merged
and non-merged ﬁrms are exactly the same. Given that the equilibrium prices
are identical, also the demand is identical both for merging and non-merging







(v − t − c)(2N − n − 1)
N(N − 1)
However, it is easy to check that these expressions are equivalent to the
one of proﬁts before merger.









t =1 , a merger between k ﬁr m sd o e sn o t
display the free-riding property: outsider ﬁrms are not better oﬀ with respect






21The conclusion is that the merger paradox does not arise for this region
of parameters in the spokes model: the free-riding property characterizing
the equilibrium of Bertrand-like models is not operating in this equilibrium.
In fact, for this region of the parameters, a merger is perfectly rational from
the perspective of insiders as soon as there is an  >0 cost synergy resulting
from the merger.
This is one of the main results of the paper and can be interpreted as
follows: in Region 2 ﬁrms focus on the kink of their demand taking place
in presence of consumers who lack a second available brand. As underlined
above, all consumers with at least one favourite brand available participate in
the market. This implies that the size of the market does not shrink: exactly
the same share of consumers is served as in the case of Region 1. However,
in this case the merger does not have an eﬀect on any kind of ﬁrm as the
type of consumers that the ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to focus on is unaﬀected by
the new market conﬁguration. This is, in fact, driving to the conclusion that
in a spatial structure like the spokes model, the free-riding merger paradox
does not take place for a non-negligible subset of the parameter space.
The indiﬀerence result obtained is not new in the literature: Brito[1]
has proved that non-neighbouring ﬁrms in the circle model are completely
unaﬀected by an eventual merger. This is due to the lack of interdependence
o ft h ep r i c e so ft h eﬁrms merged: when competition is limited to neighbouring
ﬁrms, ﬁrms joining forces does not have implications on the demand faced.
However, this is not the case in the spokes model. In principle, competition
takes place between all ﬁrms, no matter their relative location. In this region,
nevertheless, the ﬁrm has an incentive to focus on a particular group of
consumers: it is only competition and proﬁt incentives that determine the
indiﬀerence result and not the topological structure of the market.
It is worth noting that a corollary of the results obtained above is that
the proﬁtability of the merger is completely independent of the number of
ﬁrms taking part in the coalition.
224.3 Region 3
Suppose instead that all ﬁrms after merger, both merged and not, do not
satisfy completely the segment of the market for which they are monopolist.













[2v(N − n)+t(n − 1)](4N − 2n − 1)
4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k
+
+
c{2N[4N − 4n − 2k − 1] + n(2n +3 k) − k2 +2 k}




[2v(N − n)+t(n − 1)](4N − 2n − k)+c(2N − n − k)(4N − 2n + k − 2)
4N(4N − 5n − k − 1) + 6n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k




k(2N − n − k)(4N − 2n − 1)2[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2




(2N − n − 1)(4N − 2n − k)2[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)[4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k]2
These expressions drive directly to the following result:












t < 1 , a merger between k ﬁrms
is proﬁtable with respect to the pre-merger situation. However, the merged






T h eP r o o fc a nb ef o u n di nA p p e n d i xC .
T h er e s u l t sj u s ts t a t e dc o n ﬁrm that the price competition mergers para-
dox also takes place in Region 3. This might be less intuitive than what
found in Region 1: competition in this region implies extracting all surplus
from the consumers who lack a second alternative brand. In this region the
23elasticity of demand is larger on the monopolistic segment implying price in-
creasing competition. However, also in this case the mechanisms highlighted
by Deneckere-Davidson[5] are in operation. The best response functions are
still upward sloping so that prices of both insiders and outsiders increase.
As both types are better oﬀ, the free-riding property is still in operation.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ef o c u so fﬁr m si ss h i f t e df r o mt h ed u o p o l i s t i cr e g i o nd o e s
not harm the validity of the intuition provided by Deneckere-Davidson: as
outsiders face competition from both the merged entity and the other out-
siders, they share with a given insider n−2 competitors. But the remaining
competitor of the outsider ﬁrm is a ﬁrm who is member of the merged en-
tity, charging a higher price; the insider ﬁrm, instead, faces competition by
another outsider, charging a lower price. This implies that the proﬁts of the
outsiders dominate the ones of insiders as in Region 3. The following example
illustrates the ﬁndings reported.
Example 3
As in Example 1, assume N =7 , n =5 , m =4 , k =2 , v =2and, as
in Chen-Riordan[4], t =1and c =0 ; the demand functions for insiders and



































































pαDα(pα,p −α) πj = pjDj(pj,p −j)
the Nash equilibrium prices are:
pm =1 .074 pnm =1 .011
24πm =0 .384 πnm =0 .195
as compared with the pre-merger status quo, that as discussed in Section 4.2,
giving the following results:
pbm =1 .000 πbm =0 .190
4.4 Region 4











nm = v − t
2.
It is extremely simple to show that in equilibrium the proﬁts of merged
and non-merged ﬁrms are exactly the same. Given that equilibrium prices
are identical, also the demand is identical both for merging and non-merging







2(v − c) − t
2N
This expression corresponds to the one of proﬁts before merger.












2,am e r g e rb e t w e e nk ﬁrms does not
display the free-riding property: outsider ﬁrms are not better oﬀ with respect






The conclusion is that also for this region of parameters the merger para-
dox does not arise in the spokes model: the free-riding property characterizing
the equilibrium of Bertrand-like models is not operating in this equilibrium.
Once more, an  >0 cost synergy resulting from the merger is suﬃcient to
explain why a merger takes place.
Together with the result for Region 2, this is one of the main ﬁndings of
the paper and can be interpreted as follows: in Region 4 ﬁrms focus on the
kink of their demand taking place in presence of the indiﬀerent consumers on
25their own spoke, who lack a second available brand. Only consumers whose
ﬁrst brand is available are served: this implies a restriction of the size of the
market as compared to the other equilibrium regions. However, also in this
case the merger does not have an eﬀect on any of the ﬁrms as the type of
consumers they ﬁnd optimal to focus on is unaﬀected by the change in the
market conﬁguration. Once more these result do not depend on the number
of ﬁrms participating in the merger.
4.5 Discussion
The analysis of the four equilibrium regions has showed how several eco-
nomic mechanisms are in operation in the spokes model. These mechanisms
determine the eﬀects of an horizontal merger between ﬁrms. The results can
be roughly interpreted as follows: when genuine price competition is in oper-
ation, as in Region 1 and 3, then the "free-riding" property of the equilibrium
takes place and the standard classical results highlighted by the literature are
conﬁrmed. A completely new result, however, takes place in Region 2 and
4. As in these regions ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to focus on two types of indiﬀer-
ent consumer, then the equilibrium prices result independent of whether a
subset of ﬁrms merge or they all remain independent. The same is true for
proﬁts and this implies that an inﬁnitesimal positive further advantage of
conglomeration is suﬃcient to explain why mergers take place in such situ-
ations. The regions just analyzed may seem to capture a rather peculiar case.
However, this is not completely true. First of all, their relevance is witnessed
by the extent of the sub-space of parameters for which such equilibria take
place: this is not sensibly diﬀerent with respect to the remaining two regions.
Moreover in Region 4 ﬁrms, by focusing on the indiﬀerent consumer who does
not have an alternative, serve only their own spoke; however, in Region 2,
ﬁrms serve all consumers but the ones who have preferences for non-existing
brands only. In this sense competition between ﬁr m si sf u l l yi no p e r a t i o n .
Finally, it is often observed in the business world that ﬁrms target a speciﬁc
26Figure 4: The eﬀect of a merger on equilibrium prices for insiders and out-
siders, as compared to the status quo.
class of indiﬀerent consumers: this might imply that, "mutatis mutandis",
these results may be relevant to interpret the strategic behaviour of ﬁrms in
a wide set of situations.
The results just discussed are graphically summarized in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. Figure 4 reports equilibrium prices for the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms
as a function of the valuation of the good. It is clear that both the price
of merged and non-merged ﬁr m si sa tl e a s ta sh i g ha st h ep r e - m e r g e rp r i c e .
However, in Region 1 and Region 3 the price of merged ﬁrms exceeds the
price of non-merged ﬁrms. This is the "free-riding" result, illustrated further
by the comparison of proﬁts in Figure 5: the proﬁts after the merger are
at least as high as the proﬁts before the merger. However, in Region 1 and
27Figure 5: The eﬀect of a merger on ﬁrms’ proﬁts: insiders and outsiders
compared to the before merger scenario.
Region 3 the proﬁts of non-merged ﬁrms dominate the proﬁts of each of the
ﬁrms participating in the merger.
As underlined, the equilibrium regions presented do not exhaust the space
of parameters for which the equilibrium exists.We do not formally describe
and analyze those regions, as in them the free-riding property is even stronger
than in the regions described. The intuition is the following: in these regions,
non-merged ﬁr m sh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et od e v i a t et oa ne v e nl o w e rp r i c ew i t h
respect to the merged ones. This implies non-merged ﬁrms get proportionally
higher proﬁts. These regions can be identiﬁed as the shadowed areas in Figure
3, Figure 4 and Figure 5.
285C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has shown how the mergers paradox may not take place when
ﬁrms are competing in prices on a spatially diﬀerentiated market. The spokes
model is based on a system of preferences representing a generalization of
the Hotelling linear city framework to n ﬁrms competition. It is probably
the ﬁrst model of non-localized spatial competition and captures the idea of
Chamberlinian competition as a limiting case. In the context of the spokes
model, it is established for which combinations of the parameters ﬁrms do
have an incentive to merge. These are contrasted with regions in which the
standard free-riding property is in operation.
The results presented may provide a possible interpretation of mergers in
several markets. The spokes model builds on a system of preferences which
can be seen as well approximating the structure of real geographical markets
or diﬀerentiated product markets. When the geographical structure is such
that there is a centre and all ﬁrms are concentrated around that, as in a city
with several industrial districts in the periphery, the spokes model may seem
an appropriate description of reality. This interpretation may be even more
sensible in cases of product diﬀerentiation in which consumers are interested
t oas p e c i ﬁc brand and are indiﬀerent between all other brands supplied in the
market. The merger waves registered in those markets may be interpreted, in
t h el i g h to ft h er e s u l ts h o w n ,o np u r e l yc ompetitive grounds. In particular,
t h er e s u l t so b t a i n e ds u g g e s tt h i sm i g h tbet h ec a s ew h e nﬁr m st a r g e tas pe c i ﬁc
segment of indiﬀerent consumers.
These ﬁndings have important policy implications too. A typical concern
in presence of merging activity is the price eﬀect: concentration may imply an
increase in the price level that damages consumers’ welfare. In markets whose
features are well described by the spokes model, however, this is not always
the case. Prices for both insiders and outsiders increase if the equilibrium
implies focusing on the elastic segments of the demand: in this case a merger
can be questioned on consumers’ welfare ground. In case, instead, that the
29equilibrium involves ﬁrms focusing on the inelastic segments of the demand,
an antitrust authority should not be worried as the prices are not aﬀected
by the merger and there may only be positive eﬀects linked to synergies or
other types of gains in eﬃciency foreseen by the companies which decided to
merge.
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32A Appendix: the Benchmark Case
This appendix contains the derivation of the price equilibrium in the four





























2N − n − 1
2(n − 1)
Imposing symmetry, the equilibrium price turns out to be:
p
∗ = c + t
2N − n − 1
n − 1







consistent with the results of Chen-Riordan[4]. Clearly, the equilibrium
quantity and proﬁts are, respectively:
q
∗ =




t(2N − n − 1)2
(n − 1)N(N − 1)
Incentives to deviate globally from the candidate equilibrium must be checked.
The only potentially proﬁtable deviation is to raise price to p = v − t.T h i s
would ensure the ﬁrm a proﬁt:







Such a deviation is not proﬁtable if π ≤ π∗ which implies:











Suppose: p∗ = v − t: to show that the candidate price is an equilibrium,
it has to be checked that a small increase or decrease in price does not lead
to an increase in proﬁt. A small increase in price leads to Region III. The
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v ≥ c +2 t




















































(n − 1)(p∗ + t)+2 v(N − n)
2v(2N − n − 1)
and, imposing symmetry, the equilibrium price:
p
∗ =
2v(N − n)+t(n − 1) + c(2N − n − 1)
4N − 3n − 1
Clearly, the equilibrium quantity and proﬁts are, respectively:
q
∗ =
(2N − n − 1)[2(v − c)(N − n) − t(n − 1)]
tN(N − 1)(4N − 3n − 1)
34π
∗ =
(2N − n − 1)[2(v − c)(N − n) − t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)(4N − 3n − 1)2
Region IV
Assume p∗ = v− t
2: to show that the candidate price is an equilibrium, it
has to be checked that a small increase or decrease in price does not lead to
an increase in proﬁt. A small increase in price leads to an equilibrium region
in which the market is not fully covered and ﬁrms behave like monopolists.
























v ≥ c + t

























v ≤ c +
t
2
4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
B Appendix: Identiﬁcation of Equilibrium Re-
gions
The identiﬁcation of the equilibrium regions passes through the character-
ization of the incentives to deviate of ﬁrms from the candidate equilibrium
35prices. This allows to characterize the threshold values of v reported below
and in the text.
v1D =m a x {c +
2t(N−1)
n−1 ,v IDm,v IDnm} v1U =m i n {¯ vbm, ¯ vm, ¯ vnm}
v2D =m a x {c +2 t,vIIDm,v IIDnm} v2U =m i n {c +2 tN−1
n−1,v IIUm,v IIUnm}
v3D =m a x {c + t
2
4N−n−3
2N−n−1,v IIIDmvIIIDnm} v3U =m i n {c +2 t,vIIIUm,v IIIUnm}











t > 1 and
v−p∗
nm
t > 1. I no r d e rt oc h e c kt h i si sa ne q u i l i b r i u m ,i th a st ob es h o w n
that both merged and non-merged ﬁrms do not have an incentive to deviate
to a diﬀerent price. Focus on one of the merged ﬁrms, say i.F i r s t , s h e
must not have incentives to deviate to a higher price as pi = v − t given the
price of the other merging and the non-merging ﬁrms is unchanged. This is
















Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≥ vIDm where:
vIDm = c +
t(4nN − 3n − 2N − kn− k2 − 2k +1 )
(2n + k − 2)(n − k)
Moreover, in order for an equilibrium to exist for the merged ﬁrms, following















Solving for v, it is found that this condition holds for v ≤ ¯ vm(N,n,k,t,c).I t
follows that the equilibrium for merging ﬁrms exist for:
vIDm ≤ v ≤ ¯ vm
36Turn now to non-merging ﬁrms. If one of the non-merged ﬁrms, say j,











Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≥ vIDnm where:
vIDnm = c +
t(4Nn− 2kN − 4n − k2 +3 k)
(2n + k − 2)(n − k)
Moreover, in order for an equilibrium to exist for the merged ﬁrms, following















Solving for v, it is found that this condition holds for v ≤ ¯ vnm(N,n,k,t,c).
It follows that the equilibrium for non-merging ﬁrms exist for:
vIDnm ≤ v ≤ ¯ vnm
From the benchmark case, it is possible to recall that equilibrium in





Bringing together all the information, it is veriﬁed that an equilibrium which
is incentive compatible before and after merger and for both merged and
non-merged ﬁrms exist for the following subset of values of v:
v1D =m a x {c +
2t(N − 1)
n − 1
,v IDm,v IDnm} ≤ v ≤ min{¯ vbm, ¯ vm,¯ vnm} = v1U
Region 2









t =1 .F o c u s ﬁr s to nag i v e nm e r g i n gﬁrm, say i. I tm u s tb er u l e d
out that she has an incentive to raise her price to pi >v− t or decrease it
to pi <v− t. Consider a price increase, in that case the demand faced by
the ﬁrm is as if she was in Region III, given the other ﬁrms stick to their

















v ≥ vIIDm = c + t
4N − 2n − k − 1
2N − n − k
Consider instead a price decrease, in that case the demand faced by ﬁrm i is
as if they were in Region I, given the other ﬁrms stick to their equilibrium

















v ≤ vIIUm = c + t
2N − k − 1
n − k
Turn now to non-merging ﬁrms. An analogous reasoning allows to rule
out possible deviations. Suppose in particular that ﬁrm j raises her price
to pj >v− t. In that case the demand faced by the ﬁrm is as if she was in











w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s :
v ≥ vIIDnm = c +2 t
If ﬁrm j decreases her price, instead, to pj <v− t. In that case the
demand faced by the ﬁrm is as if she was in Region I. In order for this not












v ≤ vIIUnm = c +2 t
N − 1
n − 1
From the benchmark case, it is possible to recall that equilibrium in Region
II was deﬁned for:
c +2 t<v≤ c +2 t
N − 1
n − 1
Bringing together all the information, it is veriﬁed that an equilibrium which
is incentive compatible before and after merger and for both merged and
non-merged ﬁrms exist for the following subset of values of v:
v2D =m a x {c+2t,vIIDm,v IIDnm} ≤ v ≤ min{c+2t
N − 1
n − 1
,v IIUm,v IIUnm} = v2U
Region 3













t < 1. It has to be checked that at the proposed equilibrium
prices there are no incentives to deviate. In this case there are two possible
deviations possibilities for the merged ﬁrms and for the non-merged: they
can potentially deviate either to p = v − t or to p = v − t
2.
Consider ﬁrst one of the merging ﬁrms, say i. Suppose she raises the price
to pi = v − t



















Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≥ vIIIDm where:
vIIIDm = c +
t
2
4N(4N − 3n − k − 3) + n(2n +3 k)+2 ( k +1 )
2N(4N − 4n − 2k − 1) + n(2n +3 k) − k2 +2 k
On the other hand, if the ﬁrm decreases her price to pm = v − t then it has





nm=( p1 − c)
∂D1
∂p1






39Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≤ vIIIUm where:
vIIIUm = c + t
4N(4N − 4n − k − 2) + n(4n +3 k +3 )− k2 +2 k +1
2N(4N − 4n − 2k − 1) + n(2n +3 k) − k2 +2 k
It follows that the equilibrium for merging ﬁrms exist for:
vIIIDm ≤ v ≤ vIIIUm
Turn now to non-merging ﬁrms. If one of the non-merged ﬁrms, say j,
tries to deviate it will cut her price to pj = v − t then for the deviation not











Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≤ vIIIUnm where:
vIIIUnm = c +
t
2
4N(4N − 3n − k − 3) + n(2n + k +6 )− k2 +4 k
2N(4N − 4n − k − 2) + n(2n + k +2 )− k2 +2 k
On the other hand, if j raises her price to pj = v − t
2 then the following













Solving for v drives to the conclusion that it holds if v ≥ vIIIDnm where:
vIIIDnm = c + t
4N(4N − 4n − k − 2) + 2n(2n + k +2 )− k2 +3 k
2N(4N − 4n − k − 2) + n(2n + k +2 )− k2 +2 k
It follows that the equilibrium for non-merging ﬁrms exist for:
vIIIDnm ≤ v ≤ vIIIUnm
From the benchmark case, it is possible to recall that equilibrium in




4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
<v≤ c +2 t
40Bringing together all the information, it is veriﬁed that an equilibrium
which is incentive compatible before and after merger and for both merged
and non-merged ﬁrms exist for the following subset of values of v:
v3D =m a x {c+
t
2
4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
,v IIIDm,v IIIDnm} ≤ v ≤ min{c+2t,vIIIUm,v IIIUnm} = v3U
Region 4












2.F o c u sﬁr s to nag i v e nm e r g i n gﬁrm, say i.I tm u s tb er u l e do u t
that she has an incentive to raise her price to pi >v− t
2or decrease it to
pi <v− t
2. Consider a price increase, in that case the demand faced by the
ﬁrm is as if she was a local monopolist, given the other ﬁrms stick to their



















v ≥ vIIDm = c + t
Consider instead a price decrease, in that case the demand faced by ﬁrm i is
as if they were in Region III, given the other ﬁrms stick to their equilibrium



















v ≤ vIVUm = c +
t
2
4N − n − k − 2
2N − n − 1
Turn now to non-merging ﬁrms. An analogous reasoning allows to rule
out possible deviations. Suppose in particular that ﬁrm j raises her price to
pj >v− t
2. In that case the demand faced by the ﬁrm is the one of a local













41w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s :
v ≥ vIVDnm = c + t
If ﬁrm j decreases her price, instead, to pj <v− t
2. In that case the
demand faced by the ﬁrm is as if she was in Region III. In order for this not














v ≤ vIVUnm = c +
t
2
4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
From the benchmark case, it is possible to recall that equilibrium in Region
II was deﬁned for:
c + t<v≤ c +
t
2
4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
Bringing together all the information, it is veriﬁed that an equilibrium which
is incentive compatible before and after merger and for both merged and
non-merged ﬁrms exist for the following subset of values of v:
v4D =m a x {c+t,vIVDm,v IVDnm} ≤ v ≤ min{c+
t
2
4N − n − 3
2N − n − 1
,v IVUm,v IVUnm} = v4U
C Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1


















t(2n − k)(n − 1)(2N − n − 1)[4Nn+( n +1 ) ( k − 2n)]
N(N − 1)[k2 + k(n − 2) − 2n(n − 1)]2
−
t[2N(2n − 1) − 2n2 − n +1 ] 2
N(N − 1)(2n + k − 2)[k2 + k(n − 2) − 2n(n − 1)]








(k − 1)[n(k +1 )− k](2N − n − 1)2
(2n + k − 2)2(N − 1)N(n − k)2

















t[2N(2n − 1) − 2n2 − n +1 ] 2
N(N − 1)(2n + k − 2)[k2 + k(n − 2) − 2n(n − 1)]
−
t(2N − n − 1)2
(n − 1)N(N − 1)







(k − 1)[n(3k − 1) + k2 − 3k +1 ] ( 2 N − n − 1)2
(N − 1)N(2n + k − 2)2(n − k)(n − 1)









k then a fortiori π∗
nm >π ∗
bm. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3


















(2N − n − 1)(4N − 2n − k)2[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)[4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k]2
−
(2N − n − k)(4N − 2n − 1)2[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)[4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k]2








(k − 1)[(2N − n)(k − 1) − k][2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)[4N(4N − 5n − k − 1) + 6n2 +2 n +3 kn− k2 +2 k]2

















(2N − n − k)(4N − 2n − 1)2[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)[4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k]2
−
(2N − n − 1)[2(v − c)(N − n)+t(n − 1)]2
tN(N − 1)(4N − 3n − 1)2







A(N,n,k)[2(N − n)(v − c)+t(n − 1)]2(k − 1)
tN(N − 1)(4N − 3n − 1)2[4N(4N − 5n + k +1 )+6 n2 + n(3k +2 )− k2 +2 k]2
where A(N,n,k) is a long and uninteresting positive expression under the










k then a fortiori π∗
nm >π ∗
bm. Q.E.D.
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